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Abstract
Many social phenomena can be modeled as cascades in networks, where
nodes adopt a behavior in response to peers adopting. When studying cascades,
researchers typically assume that the number of active peers when a node adopts
is equivalent to the node’s threshold for adoption. This assumption is rarely
justified due to the “opacity problem”: networked cascades reveal intervals
which contain thresholds, rather than point estimates. Existing approaches take
the maximum of each node’s threshold interval, which biases models of social
influence. Opacity is inevitable in many small graphs when using the threshold
model, resulting from the networked process itself rather than data collection
techniques. Using simulation, we extend this finding to the probabilistic SI
(independent cascade) model. We confirm these theoretical results by studying
50 large hashtag cascades among 3.2 million Twitter users, finding that 20%
of adoptions suffer from opacity. Different assumptions in response to opacity
qualitatively change conclusions about peer influence. While opacity is a far-
reaching problem, it can be addressed. Using information from nodes who have
tightly bounded intervals allows building models to reduce error in estimating
node thresholds.
Keywords: social contagion, social influence, peer effects, measurement
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1 Introduction
Like epidemic diseases [29, 47, 11], social contagions are ubiquitous, highly conse-
quential, and widely studied [22, 41, 42, 13, 33, 44, 45, 15, 46]. Unlike nearly all
diseases, social contagions often require multiple sources of infection, especially if
adoption is costly, risky, motivated by affect, or entails positive network externalities
[13].
In this paper, we explore a challenge for studies of contagion: data generated
by networked processes typically does not provide all of the information needed
to recover peer influence, even when cascades are tracked precisely. This occurs
due to the “opacity problem”: cascades provide intervals in which node thresholds
lie, but often do not indicate the threshold itself. Researchers typically infer the
amount of social reinforcement required for adoption by recording node exposure
(number of active neighbors) when the node activates. We refer to this practice as
the exposure-at-activation (EAA) rule, which is equivalent to taking the maximum
of the threshold interval for each node. This leads to an upward bias in estimates
of peer reinforcement needed for adoption at the node level, and can bias models of
peer effects.
The EAA rule can be found in diverse studies across disciplines, including so-
ciology [20, 45, 19], economics [18, 10, 5], medicine [15], and information science
[1, 39, 40, 21, 43, 9, 53]. It is even implicitly present in “snapshot” studies [3, 17]
and in networks surveyed in waves such as Add Health [8].
Simulated cascades using both deterministic and probabilistic activation rules
indicate that the opacity problem creates substantial bias. An empirical study of
hashtag cascades among 3.2 million users on Twitter confirms this intuition: about
20% of hashtag first usages have uncertain adoption thresholds. For 2 in 5 hashtags,
different responses to the opacity problem produce qualitatively different conclusions
about whether peer reinforcement promotes diffusion.
We provide several tools for addressing the opacity problem. First, a simple
condition can be applied to recover node threshold intervals. Nodes with small
threshold intervals can be used to estimate a threshold model, which can then be
applied to all nodes. In simulations, this process substantially reduces error in
estimating thresholds. In addition, we expect future research to develop novel ways
to further reduce measurement error introduced by opacity and the EAA rule.
While the opacity problem may seem complex, the core intuition is simple and is
summarized in Figure 1: for some network-threshold configurations, some nodes will
always activate with exposure greater than threshold. This occurs because all nodes
cannot check the status of neighbors all of the time. To use a familiar example:
suppose a person “looks away” from her phone while many friends adopt a behavior
on a social media platform. When she comes back, she sees that several friends
have adopted and she promptly adopts. Ascertaining which friend was pivotal is a
complex counterfactual question which the data does not directly answer. A similar
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analogy can be made about states adopting policies [48], college students selecting
majors [18], or any number of other behaviors.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the threshold model
and show that for some specific network configurations, the opacity problem is
inevitable. An exhaustive survey of all small graphs with all threshold assignments
is conducted, which indicates that even in small networks, the opacity problem
creates substantial uncertainty. We propose a condition for bounding node-level
uncertainty which is the basis of many of our subsequent results. In Section 3, we
conduct a variety of simulations using the threshold model from Section 2, finding
that the application of the EAA rule creates substantial upward bias in estimates
of thresholds. We also simulate the susceptible-infected (SI) [25] or independent
cascade model (ICM) [27], finding that the opacity problem arises in the probabilistic
case as well. We show that a modeling procedure using node threshold intervals
with low uncertainty can substantially reduce the upward bias of the EAA rule. In
Section 4 we turn to an empirical case: hashtag cascades on Twitter. This analysis
indicates that the opacity problem is present in a data-rich case from social media.
We conclude with a discussion of implications and suggestion for future work.
To our knowledge, we are the first to highlight the full scope of this problem,
although aspects of it have been discussed in [45, 32, 39].
2 Model
2.1 Model definition
We choose a threshold model similar to previous work [22, 50, 27] to illustrate the
opacity problem. We study the threshold model formally, and show using simulation
below that our results apply to probabilistic models of contagion as well.
A graph G = (V,E) has nodes V and edges E. We assume that G is undirected
and connected. Nodes are indexed by i and j, with N(i) indicating all nodes in the
neighborhood of i. A diffusion process plays out on this graph over times t ≥ 0.
Nodes have activation statuses at each t indicated by yi(t) ∈ {0, 1}, with yi(t) = 0
indicating inactive and yi(t) = 1 indicating active. Once a node activates, it remains
active for the rest of the diffusion process. Edges may have weights wij , although
weights are set to 1 in results presented here to reduce the complexity of the model
space1. Nodes have integer-valued thresholds hi ≥ 0, indicating the minimum level
of peer reinforcement required for adoption2. A node adopts when it updates at
time t and exposure is greater than threshold, ki(t) =
∑
j∈N(i)wijy
t
j ≥ hi, where j
ranges over neighbors of i.
The update step proceeds as follows: at time t, an inactive node i is chosen at
1Constructing a weighted example where opacity happens is straightforward. For example,
change one of the edge weights to 2 in Figure 1.
2Results do not change with fractional thresholds, as demonstrated in simulations below.
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random to update3. This update process produces a well-defined update ordering
contained in vector u. The vector ui indicates all times at which i updates. When
i updates, i checks the status of all neighbors j ∈ N(i), and if ∑j∈N(i) yj ≥ hi,
i activates immediately and yi(t) = 1. While random updating and instantaneous
activation are not realistic modeling choices, results are not sensitive to these sim-
plifications4.
In an important distinction from past work, whether or not i activates at t,
i’s exposure ki(t) is recorded. Recording i’s exposure when i does not update is
crucial to addressing the opacity problem. Throughout the paper, we will refer to
exposure-at-activation (EAA) and the “EAA rule”, which we define here.
Definition 1. Assume node i first activates at time t. Then i’s exposure-at-
activation (EAA) is ki(t).
Definition 2. The exposure-at-activation (EAA) rule estimates threshold hi
by the exposure-at-activation. If i first activates at time t, the EAA is ki(t) and the
EAA rule assumes hi = ki(t).
The use of the EAA rule is straightforward when adoptions are timestamped.
However, many studies of diffusion use networks surveyed in waves, such as Add
Health (e.g. [8]) or network snapshots [3]. The activation decision is only observed
after a (potentially unknown) delay. In this case, the time a survey is administered
is functionally the “adoption time”, since it is the first time a node is observed as
active. If “survey time” or “collection time” is substituted for “activation time”,
our results fully apply to network snapshots as well.
2.1.1 Model remarks
We have chosen a simple threshold model which abstracts away many aspects of
reality. While past work has made similar simplifying assumptions [22, 27, 28, 13,
50], this paper fundamentally concerns empirical data. We use a model to motivate
a claim about the empirical study of social contagion.
Because of this, it is crucial that results presented here are not artifacts of par-
ticular modeling assumptions. We have attempted to examine our results under as
many assumptions as possible. Cases we have considered are: integer and fractional
thresholds, weighted networks, non-random update orderings, various distributions
3Any continuous distribution producing node update times will give a full ordering of nodes
with probability 1, since the probability of two nodes updating at exactly the same time is 0. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. Simultaneous updating processes do not fix
the opacity problem, as indicated in a previous draft of this paper.
4Figure 1 shows a case which demonstrates this: the opacity problem occurs regardless of the
order in which nodes update, meaning that random updating is not a critical assumption. Giving
nodes an activation delay after updating would not substantively change results, since j or k would
have to activate first, leading to the other node being measured with error.
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of thresholds (normal, uniform, exponential), allowing nodes to update simultane-
ously, probabilistic activation models (independent probabilities), allowing nodes to
have activation delays, allowing nodes to have transmission delays5, and allowing
nodes to notify neighbors of activation. In each of these cases, the opacity problem
remains a problem, and can be demonstrated with simple examples akin to Figure
1.
On the other hand, the threshold model considered here has a surprising amount
of flexibility. It makes few assumptions about G or the distributions of hi and u.
This is by design: the opacity problem occurs in small graphs that are very likely
to occur for a wide range of specific assumptions.
While we consider several extensions to this model, four assumptions are fixed
throughout. The most important of these is the static nature of the graph G. In
reality, edges are created and decay in networks all the time [30]. While a dynamic
graph does not eliminate the opacity problem, it may reduce its impact by sparsi-
fying the graph. A second simplification is the assumption that diffusion is entirely
endogenous: once the threshold is known, no other node-level information is relevant
for the unfolding of the diffusion process. In practice, changing circumstances may
dynamically alter node thresholds, creating additional challenges for estimating peer
effects. Third, we assume throughout that peer influence is driving adoption, rather
than a process orthogonal to the social network. Fourth, we assume that people are
aware of the activation statuses of their neighbors and do not suffer from limited
attention [52]6.
2.2 The opacity problem in the threshold model
The opacity problem is inevitable in certain network configurations using the thresh-
old model defined above. Consider the simple network in Figure 1, which is a triad
among nodes i, j, k. Node i is an innovator with threshold 0, while nodes j and k
have threshold 1. Any update ordering for this graph will produce an over-estimate
of at least one node’s threshold. Since node i must adopt first, there are only two
possible orderings in which nodes can activate: (i, j, k) or (i, k, j). In the former
case, k adopts with 2 active neighbors despite having threshold 1, while in the lat-
ter case j adopts with 2 active neighbors despite having threshold 1. Applying
the exposure-at-activation (EAA) rule would produce an over-estimate of the node
threshold in these cases.
In practice, how can we determine if node thresholds are measured precisely or
not? For instance, in Figure 1-A, node j could activate with 1 active neighbor but
have a true threshold of zero. We need to place a lower bound on the threshold in
addition to an upper bound. Recording exposure ki(t) when nodes remain inactive
allows us to do this.
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
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Consider the diffusion process in Figure 2, which replicates the graph and thresh-
old assignment of Figure 1 but changes the update ordering to u = (j, k, i, j, k). This
update ordering does not affect the order in which nodes activate (which remains
(i, j, k)), but provides lower bounds on the threhsolds of nodes j and k. The lower
bound on node i arises by assuming there are no negative thresholds7. Note that
node j has an interval of [0, 1], indicating that 0 active neighbors were insufficient
to trigger adoption, while 1 active neighbor was sufficient. j’s threshold is therefore
known with certainty to be 1 (recall we assume integer threhsolds). For node k, 0
neighbors was insufficient while 2 neighbors were sufficient, indicating uncertainty
about whether k’s threshold is 1 or 2. Therefore, j’s threshold is measured precisely
while k’s threshold suffers from opacity.
This suggests a formal precise measurement condition. Consider a node i which
updates at t and some later t′. Assume i is inactive at t (yi(t) = 0) and active at t′
(yi(t
′) = 1), giving threshold interval [ki(t), ki(t′)].
Condition 1. The threshold for i is precisely measured if i is inactive at t (yi(t) =
0), active at t′ (yi(t′) = 1), and the width of the interval [ki(t), k(t′)] = 1.
In other words, if exposure changed by exactly one and this triggered i’s adop-
tion, then we know the last neighbor to activate provided the “final push” for adop-
tion.
Condition 1 has two edge cases. First, innovators who adopt with 0 active
neighbors are measured precisely only by assumption. These nodes technically have
no lower bound on their threshold intervals. Second, some nodes may have no lower
bound, for instance a node who first updates and activates at exposure 2. Condition
1 categorizes these nodes as imprecisely measured.
In Figure 3 we apply Condition 1 to all small graphs of orders 2 to 4, with all
threshold assignments that support diffusion. These graph-threshold combinations
are the building blocks of large cascades. Figure 3 indicates that for 75% of these
graph-threshold combinations, at least one node always has an interval which is
not precisely measured according to Condition 1. This plot also shows the pro-
portion of precisely measured nodes given nodes update randomly, indicating that
measurement is difficult in many small graphs.
3 Simulation evidence
Simulating the threshold model in the previous section provides a method to examine
the severity of the opacity problem under different assumptions [34]. In this case,
thresholds are known with certainty which allows exact quantification of error.
We use simulation to perform two analyses. First, the impact of opacity on
observational threshold distributions is assessed. Then, we demonstrate that com-
7The appropriateness of this assumption has to be investigated in each individual case. Negative
thresholds may indicate “super-eager” nodes.
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bining Condition 1 with a predictive model such as linear regression can reduce the
error in estimated thresholds.
Graphs are generated either with a power law with clustering (PLC) algorithm
[26] with clustering parameter 0.1, or with a Baraba`si-Albert (BA) procedure [6].
All graphs have 1000 nodes, and have degrees ranging between 12 and 20. Each
parameter set is replicated 1000 times to minimize sampling variance8.
The threshold model developed above is simulated in the following way. At
each time step t′, choose an inactive i. Node i checks its exposure ki(t′), and we
record this exposure regardless of whether i activates. If ki(t
′) ≥ hi, yi(t′) is set to
1. If i activates, its exposure at t′ is differenced from its exposure at i’s previous
update at t, ki(t
′)− ki(t). We apply Condition 1, and call i “precisely measured” if
ki(t
′) − ki(t) = 1. By assumption, nodes that activate with 0 active neighbors are
precisely measured.
In addition to the threshold model, we also simulate the susceptible-infected (SI),
or independent cascade model (ICM) [25, 27, 36]. We provide the simulation algo-
rithms in the Appendix. Since the SI model is probabilistic, this analysis provides a
robustness check against the deterministic nature of the threshold model. In the SI
model, each active node provides an independent chance for its neighbors to adopt.
We set this transmission probability to p = 0.2. Two types of contagion mechanics
are simulated for the SI model. First “pull” dynamics: when a node is selected to
update, it checks how many newly active neighbors it has, flips that many coins
with P (heads) = p, and activates if at least one comes up heads. Second, “push”
dynamics: an active node is selected at random, and a single coin with P(heads) =
p is flipped for each of its neighbors. Any neighbors that flip a heads are activated
immediately. Each active node may only “push” the contagion once.
For the SI model, the true “threshold” or “critical value” for any node is unknown
in advance. The simulation process reveals, for each node, a series of coin flips.
We record the first such coin flip that comes up heads as the “critical value” or
“threshold” for the node.
3.1 Effect of opacity on threshold distributions
The distribution of active neighbors recovered using the EAA rule systematically
differs from the true threshold distribution. Figure 5 shows the divergence using the
Baraba`si-Albert graph with mean degree 12. Distributional divergence is the case
for integer thresholds, fractional thresholds, and the SI model. The case in Figure
5-D is surprising: all nodes have a fractional threshold of 0.2, yet the distribution
recovered using the EAA rule is roughly uniform. In this case, the EAA rule records
about 10% of nodes as having “threshold” 1.0.
The EAA rule performs best in Figure 5-B, where the threshold distribution is
8We also examined Watts-Strogatz graphs but omit them for brevity since they did not mean-
ingfully change the results.
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normal. In this case, the EAA rule still produces a long tail of “high threshold”
nodes, which gives the impression that a heroic level of peer reinforcement is required
for some nodes to adopt.
These results indicate that opacity presents substantial challenges for estimating
threshold distributions. Regression-based approaches relying on a biased distribu-
tion can have an influence coefficient biased in either direction. When the EAA rule
moves observations from zero to nonzero thresholds, the strength of influence can be
overestimated. On the other hand, when the EAA rule moves low threshold nodes
to higher values, the effect of peer influence can be under-estimated. The particular
bias is based on the relative strength of these two forces.
3.2 Reducing measurement error with predictive models
Bias in thresholds can be meaningfully reduced using predictive models. The strat-
egy is straightforward: apply Condition 1 to all nodes, determine which nodes are
measured precisely, and estimate a model on these nodes only. We use Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression, although in principle any machine learning regres-
sor can be used. Then, we predict thresholds for nodes with measurement error. As
shown in Figure 4 Results indicate this approach reduces root mean squared error
(RMSE) dramatically, from 3.1 to 8.1 times baseline to 1.15 to 1.35 times baseline.
We use a power law with clustering graph and threshold function hi = 5+3xi+i,
where xi, i ∼ N (0, 1). Thresholds below 0 are set to 0. Cascade dynamics are
simulated as described above. The covariate xi represents some feature of i (e.g.
age, wealth) that provides information about how much social reinforcement i needs
before activation.
Treating thresholds as a function of node-level attributes [45] allows estimating
a threshold model
hi = α+ βxi + i (1)
This model can be estimated using only the precisely measured set of nodes to
reduce bias in thresholds. Results of this procedure compared to the EAA rule are
displayed in Figure 4. We note that this model predicts thresholds based on node
attributes, rather than on endogenous network characteristics.
The error variance represents the inherent unpredictability in thresholds and pro-
vides a natural baseline error for comparing error-reduction methods. An ordinary
least squares (OLS) model estimated on the true data will have a root-mean-square
error (RMSE) equal to the error variance, which here is set to 1.
4 Hashtag cascades
Studying hashtag cascades on Twitter, we find that the opacity problem can qual-
itatively change conclusions about the effects of peer reinforcement on adoption.
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Mean degree Nodes Activations Precisely measured
12 1000 720.7 113.4
16 1000 924.1 43.0
20 1000 983.1 13.0
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on simulations, averaged over 1000 runs. The average
number of activated nodes increases as degree increases. However, it becomes more
difficult to precisely measure nodes in higher mean degree graphs.
Twitter provides an ideal setting for this analysis: tweets (and therefore adoption
events) are timestamped and the contagion (a hashtag) can be clearly tracked. For
about 2 in 5 hashtags, different responses to opacity yield opposite conclusions about
the effectiveness of social reinforcement. At the adoption level, about 1 in 5 hashtag
adoptions show uncertainty about the amount of peer reinforcement required for
adoption.
We tracked cascades for 50 hashtags (see Appendix for list and selection proce-
dure) with between 40,000 and 360,000 unique adopters and 41,000 to 1.3 million
total usages per tag. Retweets were filtered out. A total of 3.2 million users (“ac-
tive users”) tweeted using one or more of these hashtags. These active users are
connected by 45 million bidirected @mention links, which is a common measure of
ties on Twitter [39]. An additional 105 million bidirected @mention edges connect
active users to users who were exposed but never adopted (“inactive users”). These
data contain a total of 7 billion tweets.
We choose to construct the network from bidirected @mentions because they
represent a relatively strong connection that can facilitate diffusion. This type of
link is sparser than other types of edges on Twitter, such as follows. Combined
with our findings above about the positive correlation between network density and
severity of the opacity problem, using the sparser bidirected @mention graph can
be considered a conservative test of the impact of opacity.
We examine the effect of peer reinforcement with p(k) curves [17, 39, 31], which
plot the probability of first activation with exposure k, given ever being k-exposed.
Work using this methodology has found that higher exposure levels substantially
increase the probability of hashtag adoption, particularly for controversial issues
like politics [17, 39]. More recent work has found that hashtags spread more like
simple contagion where nodes are immunized after the first exposure [31]. Since
complex contagions have different cascade dynamics than simple contagions [12,
7], understanding the effects of reinforcement is consequential for predictions and
interventions in online networks.
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4.1 Constructing threshold intervals
To construct threshold intervals, we assume updates correspond with tweet times.
While this is not a perfect assumption, a user is engaged with the Twitter platform
when tweeting, and likely checks tweets in the seconds before or after sending a
tweet. Let ui be the times i tweeted in increasing order. For hashtag g, let t
g
i ∈ ui
be i’s first usage of g, and tg−1i ∈ ui be the tweet immediately prior to i’s first usage
of g.
We construct descending time intervals (tg−1i , t
g
i ], (t
g−2
i , t
g−1
i ], etc., which give the
periods of time between i’s updates. Iterating through these intervals, we find the
most recent interval for which one or more neighbor adopted g, and count the total
number T ∗ of neighbor adoptions in that interval. If T ∗ = 1, then Condition 1 is
satisfied, since i’s exposure changed by exactly one and then i adopted. Otherwise
if T ∗ > 1, i’s threshold is uncertain within an interval of size greater than 1. For
instance if 2 neighbors activated in (tg−1i , t
g
i ] and 4 total neighbors activated before
tg−1i , then i’s threshold interval is [4, 6]. This interval is considered “imprecisely
measured” since it has size greater than 1.
4.2 Empirical measurement rates
Measurement uncertainty affects 21% of activations, although there is substantial
variation both by hashtag and exposure level. We exclude innovators (0 active
neighbors at activation) from this analysis both to focus on the effects of opacity on
estimates of peer reinforcement. Nodes which adopt with higher exposure are more
likely to suffer from measurement uncertainty 2. Among nodes that activate with
exposure 1, 91% are measured precisely. Among nodes that activate with exposure
2, only 66% are precisely measured. For each hashtag, we compute the clustering
coefficient [49] among the induced subgraph of adopters, and display measurement
rates for the top and bottom quartile of hashtags.
4.3 Social reinforcement and p(k) curves
We construct two p(k) curves for each hashtag based on the threshold intervals for
each node. The “upper” p(k) curve, notated pU (k), takes the maximum of each
threshold interval for each activation. This is equivalent to applying the EAA rule
found in much work on social contagion. The “lower” p(k) curve, notated pL(k),
takes the minimum of each threshold interval for each activation. In other words, it
assumes that the EAA rule is maximally wrong. While taking the minimum of each
threshold interval may seem like an unrealistic assumption, it has two advantages:
1) the lower curve does not have the long right tail present when using the EAA
rule (as seen in Figure 5); 2) assuming the EAA rule is maximally wrong allows us
to bound the true value in an interval, assuming that peer influence was the actual
reason for adoption.
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All Low clustering High clustering
Exposure Proportion precisely measured
1 0.91 0.90 0.97
2 0.66 0.74 0.46
3 0.64 0.70 0.43
4 0.63 0.68 0.41
5 0.63 0.66 0.42
N hashtags 50 13 13
N adoptions 1,625,759 548,420 262,890
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for Twitter hashtag cascades. There are 1.6 million
adoption events where exposure is between 1 and 5 at the time of adoption. Precise
measurement rates are higher for adoptions with exposure 1 than higher exposure
levels. Splitting hashtags into quartiles of clustering coefficient among adopters, low
and high clustering tags display substantially different precise measurement rates.
This analysis is presented in Figure 6. We find that nearly all hashtags had ini-
tially increasing upper curves, pU (2) > pU (1), corresponding to social reinforcement
facilitating adoption and qualitatively agreeing with past work [17, 39]. When turn-
ing to lower curves, we noticed via visual inspection that many hashtags had the
opposite pattern, pL(2) < pL(1), where the probability of adoption drops after the
first exposure. This pattern indicates that contagion spreads more like an indepen-
dent cascade, with exposure leading to immunization (as proposed in [31]). We find
that for 19 out of 50 hashtags (full list in Appendix), the upper curve displays the
usual pattern of increasing adoption probability in k, while the lower curve displays
the decreasing pattern. For the remaining 31 hashtags, both upper and lower curves
indicate adoption probability increasing in k, with a smaller increase for the lower
curve.
We examine three characteristics of cascades which could be correlated with
discrepancies between the upper and lower curves: 1) the total number of hash-
tag adopters; 2) the clustering coefficient among the induced subgraph of adopters;
3) the temporal burstiness of the cascade, measured by the Gini coefficient of the
number of adoptions across days between the first and last usages of a particular
hashtag. Of these three factors, clustering coefficient and burstiness have correla-
tions with a decreasing lower curve (Pearson correlation for clustering coefficient:
0.26, p = 0.063, for Gini coefficient: 0.34, p = 0.017). Hashtags with high cluster-
ing coefficients tend to have particularly pronounced differences between upper and
lower curves, as seen in Figure 6-B.
Taken together, these results indicate that the opacity problem creates more
uncertainty about cascade dynamics when adopters are clustered in dense networks
and cascades happen in short time spans. This paradoxically makes it difficult to
determine the effects of social reinforcement when adopters have high clustering,
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even though contagion which requires social reinforcement is most likely to spread
in clustered networks [13].
5 Implications and future work
The opacity problem and the application of the EAA rule present several challenges
for the study of contagion and social influence. These can be summarized into
the following categories: 1) estimating individual thresholds and the distribution of
thresholds; 2) assessing impacts on empirical models of contagion; 3) using data to
better assess uncertainty.
The first challenge we have substantially addressed in this paper. Future work
can build on this by assessing the information contained in low-error observations.
We have only considered observations measured precisely, but an observation with
a threshold interval of size 2 is much more certain than one with size 20. Bayesian
and machine learning techniques may prove useful in this direction. For instance,
formulating the labeling problem as a semi-supervised task could lead to lower error
threshold predictions than the method we have proposed. In addition, the predic-
tive value of various signals remains to be assessed empirically. For instance, in
the Twitter case, using text embeddings [35] representing cultural taste and graph
embeddings [23] indicating attention may prove useful for predicting thresholds.
The second category poses a series of issues that we have not touched upon in
this paper: the specific implications of using exposure as an independent variable in
a model estimating peer effects on adoption. A simple version of this model can be
written yi(t) = βki(t)+ i. In this case, the opacity problem plus EAA rule presents
a difficult errors-in-variables problem: ki(t) is measured with error conditional on
yi(t) = 1, with non-negative error for all nodes i. Depending on the specific form
measurement error takes, βˆ may be over- or under-estimated. Future work can
assess the impacts of opacity in a variety of empirical cases.
The third challenge takes two forms. When data about adoption times is rel-
atively granular (as in the case of social media), methodology proposed here can
be applied to assess the impacts of opacity. This is straightforward, and doing so
will provide insight both about the substantive social process and the difficulty of
measuring various diffusion processes. When data is not granular, as in the case of
surveys which may be administered yearly, care needs to be taken to assess opacity.
To address the problem, a yearly survey may consider asking about the adoption of
a behavior and about the specific time that behavior was adopted, allowing a par-
tial reconstruction of the adoption ordering among network neighbors. This could
reduce the severity of the opacity problem and lead to better inferences about social
influence.
We are aware of one case where the opacity problem can be avoided entirely: ego-
network randomization[4, 2]. In this experimental design, the researcher can control
the number of active neighbors displayed, leading to valid estimates of adoption
12
probabilities at various exposure levels.
Recognizing and addressing the opacity problem has the potential to yield more
precise answers to important questions. For instance, models of node critical values
can be used to better study complex contagion [13] empirically. Results from such
an analysis can then be applied to problems such as influence maximization [27, 28]
and the cascade prediction problem [14].
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Figure 1: A triad between nodes (i, j, k) with thresholds (0, 1, 1) over three time
periods. A) and B) display the only possible activation orderings: (i, j, k) or (i, k, j),
respectively. Node thresholds are displayed on the node, while the exposure at
activation (EAA) is displayed below the node. Blue indicates a node activates with
EAA equal to threshold, while red indicates that EAA is greater than threshold.
Since these are the only two possible activation orderings, either j or k will always
have EAA greater than threshold, leading to measurement error.
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Figure 2: A triad between nodes (i, j, k) with thresholds (0, 1, 1) over five time pe-
riods. Nodes update in order (j, k, i, j, k). This ordering allows placing bounds on
thresholds for each node, indicated by the intervals below each node (where “-” indi-
cates no measurement). Gray indicates a node updates but does not activate, blue
indicates a node activates with exposure-at-activation (EAA) equal to threshold,
while red indicates a node activates with EAA greater than threshold. When nodes
j and k update at t = 1, 2, respectively, their exposure is recorded even though
neither activates. This allows placing a lower bound on their thresholds. As the
process plays out, k activates with EAA greater than threshold. The lower bound
of 0 from k’s update at t = 2 means k has a threshold interval of [0, 2].
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Figure 3: The severity of the opacity problem in all connected graphs of order 2 to
4, with all threshold assignments that support diffusion. Each point represents a
unique threshold assignment for the graph on the x-axis. The y-axis displays the
mean number of nodes whose thresholds are uncertain when applying Condition 1.
For 86/115 (75%) of graph-threshold combinations, the EAA rule always produces at
least one uncertain node (red dots). Since these small graph-threshold combinations
are the beginnings of large cascades, we should expect measurement error when
studying social contagion observationally.
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Figure 4: Since the exposure-at-activation (EAA) rule takes the maximum of thresh-
old intervals, it leads to over-estimates of thresholds (shown in red). The dashed
black line gives the baseline RMSE, which is 1 in these simulations. The EAA rule
leads to an average error between 3.1 and 8.1 times this baseline. A model esti-
mated on the precisely measured subset (< 15% of nodes) and then used to predict
all thresholds (blue) produces much lower error of 1.14-1.35 times baseline.
16
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10
Integer threshold,
exponential
Pr
op
or
tio
n
EAA
True
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10
Integer threshold,
normal
Pr
op
or
tio
n
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Fractional threshold,
exponential
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Fractional threshold,
uniform
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10
SI (ICM),
push
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10
SI (ICM),
pull
A
B
C E
D F
+
+
+
+
Figure 5: True thresholds (blue) compared to measurements using the exposure-at-
activation (EAA) rule (red) for a variety of contagion processes. A) and B) show
the threshold model with integer thresholds drawn from an exp(β = 3) and N (5, 1),
respectively. C) and D) use fractional thresholds (note the different x-axis scale)
with 5% seed nodes. C) uses an exp(β = 3) normalized to the [0, 1] interval, while D)
sets all non-seed nodes to have threshold 0.2. E) and F) use a susceptible-infected
(SI) model, also called the independent cascade model (ICM), where each node has
an independent chance p = 0.2 to activate peers. In this case, the “threshold” is the
first coin flip to come up heads. In E), when a node activates it “pushes” contagion
to its neighbors by causing them to activate with probability p in a random order.
In F), when nodes update they check all neighbor statuses and flip a probability p
coin for each newly activated neighbor.
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Figure 6: Different responses to the opacity problem support different conclusions
of the importance of peer reinforcement for adoption. This can be seen with p(k)
curves, which plot the probability of first activation at k-exposure given ever be-
ing k-exposed. Solid lines indicate using the exposure-at-activation (EAA) rule
(the maximum of threshold intervals). Dashed lines indicate using the minimum of
threshold intervals. The shaded region is the discrepancy between the two meth-
ods. A) shows that for 19/50 hashtags (blue), the upper and lower curves lead to
different conclusions about the importance of reinforcement: use of the EAA rule
supports a complex contagion hypothesis, while taking the minimum of threshold
intervals supports an independent contagion hypothesis. B) shows that this pattern
can be replicated by taking hashtags with high and low clustering in the bidirected
@mention graph among adopters, indicating that the dynamics of hashtags in highly
clustered networks are particularly uncertain.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Simulation details
We simulate cascades using the NetworkX package in Python 3 [24]. All code is
available at https://github.com/georgeberry/thresholds. Statistical analyses
are done using Scikit Learn [37] in Python 3, and in R.
We use 4 different graph generation routines at various points: Baraba`si-Albert
[6], power-law with clustering [26], Watts-Strogatz [51], and an “atlas” of all small
graphs [38]. All four are built-in to the NetworkX package.
8.1.1 Threshold model
The algorithm for simulating diffusion is as follows.
At each time step t′,
1. An inactive node i is chosen at random
2. Node i checks how many active neighbors it has, ki(t
′)
3. The exposure at t′ is recorded
4. If ki(t
′) ≥ hi, set yi(t′) = 1
5. If i activates at t′
(a) Apply Condition 1 by differencing the exposure between t′ and i’s previ-
ous update at t, ki(t
′)− ki(t)
(b) If i did not update at any previous t, we set node i to “imprecisely
measured” unless node i activated with exposure 0, in which case we set
it to “precisely measured”
(c) If ki(t
′) − ki(t) = 1, set node i to “precisely measured”, otherwise “im-
precisely measured”
End iteration when A) all nodes have activated; B) each inactive node has been
checked consecutively without activating.
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8.1.2 SI/ICM “pull” model
This model is similar to the threshold model, except activations are decided by coin
flips instead of deterministically.
At each time step t′,
1. An inactive node i is chosen at random
2. Node i checks how many active neighbors it has, ki(t
′)
3. i checks the difference between its exposure at last update t and present,
di = ki(t
′)− ki(t)
4. i flips di coins, each of which has probability P (heads) = 0.2
5. If the jth coin comes up heads, activate i and set i’s “threshold” to ki(t) + j
(previous exposure plus coins flipped at t′ before getting heads)
6. If i activates at t′
(a) Apply Condition 1 by differencing the exposure between t′ and i’s previ-
ous update at t, ki(t
′)− ki(t)
(b) If i did not update at any previous t, we set node i to “imprecisely
measured” unless node i activated with exposure 0, in which case we set
it to “precisely measured”
(c) If ki(t
′) − ki(t) = 1, set node i to “precisely measured”, otherwise “im-
precisely measured”
End iteration when A) all nodes have activated; B) each inactive node has been
checked consecutively without activating.
8.1.3 SI/ICM “push” model
In this model active nodes are selected to update, and they get a single chance to
activate each one of their neighbors.
Initialize an empty array of active nodes that have updated, a.
At each time step t′,
1. An active node i not in a is chosen at random and appended to a
2. The neighbors of i are randomized, shuffle(N(i))
3. For each j in shuffle(N(i))
(a) Node j’s exposure kj(t
′) is recorded
(b) Node j flips a coin with P (heads) = 0.2 and activates if it comes up heads
20
(c) If j activates at t′
i. Apply Condition 1 by differencing the exposure between t′ and j’s
previous update at t, kj(t
′)− kj(t)
ii. If i did not update at any previous t, we set node j to “imprecisely
measured” unless node j activated with exposure 0, in which case we
set it to “precisely measured”
iii. If kj(t)kj(t) = 1 , set node j to “precisely measured”, otherwise
“imprecisely measured”
End iteration when A) all nodes have activated; B) all active nodes are in a.
8.1.4 Small graphs
NetworkX provides a full enumeration of all small graphs (“graph atlas”). We take
all such graphs with between two and four nodes. Then, we filter out graphs which
have more than one component, giving a set of all connected graphs with between
two and four vertices. Call this set of graphs G.
For each g ∈ G, we generate all possible critical value assignments given that
the critical value is less than or equal to node degree. For node i in graph G with
degree di, i has the critical value set Hi = {hi : hi ≤ di}. Taking the product of Hi
for all i ∈ g gives the set of critical value assignments for the graph H(g).
For each critical value assignment, we simulate cascades by updating nodes ran-
domly and activating nodes immediately if exposure is greater than critical value,
ki ≥ hi. We filter out graphs where at least one node never activates, which occurs
when each inactive node has updated yet none activates.
For these set of “admitted” graphs G∗ where all nodes eventually activate, we
simulate 100 cascades per graph. For each simulated cascade, we record exposure at
each node update. This allows applying the exposure-at-activation (EAA) rule to
determine if nodes are precisely measured or not. If node i updates at t and some
later t′, and kti + 1 = k
t′
i , then the node is precisely measured. If there is no lower
bound (e.g. no update before activation) and the exposure at activation is greater
than zero, we call the node imprecisely measured. Innovators which adopt with 0
active neighbors are considered precisely measured here. As we discuss in the main
text, this assumption about innovators may not be appropriate in all cases.
8.2 Twitter analysis
The Twitter data used for this analysis was collected for another project via the
Twitter REST API between November 2013 and October 2014. This was supported
by an NSF grant (SES 1226483). Tweets were localized to a country using the
method described in [16]. Users in Anglophone countries (US, UK, CA, AU, NZ,
SG) were extracted and retweets were filtered out. We selected users who had used
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one or more of 50 hashtags with moderate-to-high usage. We analyzed the entire
timeline of these users which was collected during the data collection process.
8.2.1 Hashtag selection
Hashtags were selected in the following way. The first occurrence of the hashtag
in the data was between 2012 and 2014. Two authors (G.B. and C.C) manually
examined the top 1000 hashtags by usage, and independently nominated tags which
they believed were related to 1) specific offline events, such as #riprobinwilliams;
2) social media phenomena, such as #windows8. The nominated tags were pooled
and the authors discussed disagreements.
The list of lowercased tags which are classified as “reinforcement supported” in
Figure 6 is: benghazi, bringbackourgirls, cantbreathe, drawsomething, election2012,
euro2012, firstvine, gop2012, harlemshake, ios6, jodiarias, justicefortrayvon, lin-
sanity, marriageequality, miley, nfldraft2014, nobama, obama2012, romney, rom-
ney2012, romneyryan2012, samelove, snowden, springbreak2014, teamobama, trayvon,
trayvonmartin, voteobama, whatdoesthefoxsay, windows8, zimmerman
The list of lowercased tags which are classified as “reinforcement uncertain”
in Figure 6 is: betawards2014, debate2012, ferguson, goodbyebreakingbad, govern-
mentshutdown, hurricanesandy, inaug2013, ivoted, kony2012, mentionsomebodyy-
ourethankfulfor, newtown, olympics2014, prayersforboston, prayfornewtown, replaceashowti-
tlewithtwerk, rippaulwalker, riprobinwilliams, sharknado2, worldcupfinal
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